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SOURCE OF SIGNIFICANT
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P

articularly since the "Warren Court" handed down its landmark decisions on school desegregation,' reapportionment, 2 and the rights of
the accused, 3 many Americans have come to believe in test case litigation
as an abundant source of significant social change in a politically "leftward" direction. One demonstration of this belief is the frequency of
newspaper articles about attempts to have a single state trial court judge
or a three-judge federal district court hold that some established procedure, whether judicial, administrative, or in the "private" market place,
is contrary to constitution, statute, or common law rights. Another is
the great increase in the number and proportion of law school applicants
who express their career aspirations in terms of persuading courts to
reshape social, economic, and political processes on behalf of poor,
peace-loving, or other relatively powerless people.
Ascertaining the validity of this belief in the fruitfulness of test case
litigation presents methodological problems. Any index based simply
on judicial opinions in recent test cases would be deceptive. The fact
that a test case has produced a favorable judicial decision does not mean
that the social change which the plaintiff or his attorney hoped thereby
to achieve has in fact ensued. The "right to treatment" of a patient committed to a mental hospital, announced by Judge Bazelon in Rouse v.
Cameron,4 may well be a right without a remedy due to the failure of
* A.B. 1964, Columbia; LL.B. 1967, Harvard; Assoc. Prof., Northeastern University School of Law; member New York Bar.
1 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U S. 483 (1954).
2 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
3 E.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Congress to fund the hospital adequately,
the lack of sufficient trained personnel or
training facilities to properly staff mental
hospitals, and the general inadequacy of
treatment techniques. 5 The attempt which
culminated in Shapiro v. Thompson6 to
guarantee subsistence welfare payments to
migrants by striking down state welfare
residency requirements may unintentionally have resulted in a lowering of the percentage of need which the previously most
generous states are willing to pay. There
are equally strong reasons to doubt that
the Warren Court's cases which on paper
gave the accused a plethora of rights have
in fact done much more than incite policemen to perjury and lower court judges to
disingenuous decisions. 7 On the other hand,
some cases, such as Brown v. Board of
Educations may, by focusing public opinion on a social problem of which the case
at bar is only a partial reflection, and by
providing some impetus towards the solution of this broader problem, make a contribution towards a social movement which
cannot be measured by the specific changes
ordered by the decision. Thus, any evaluation of how much change in social, economic, or political patterns has in fact
resulted from even "successful" test case
litigation would have to be based on a
close empirical analysis, requiring extensive, imaginative, and costly data collec-

5 The "remedy" of release, which is theoretically
available in case of continuing failure to receive
treatment, might be sufficient to coerce additional
funding from Congress, but in many cases funding alone would not permit treatment.
6 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
7 See Silverglate, Book Review, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1748 (1971).

8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tion, not only of the extent to which the
prescribed procedures have been implemented but also of other social changes,
extrinsic to the prescribed procedures and
to some extent unspecifiable in advance,
which may dampen (or occasionally amplify) their effect.
Another problem, equally serious, in
evaluating the usefulness to test case litigation by reference to recent cases is that
these may not be either a fair sample of
judicial behavior over a longer period or
a good predictor of such behavior in the
future. The Warren Court appeared willing
to change the law for the purpose of counteracting the de facto disabilities suffered
by those at the bottom of the socio-economic stratification system. Many of the
lower courts followed suit, either because
the tendency of the Supreme Court's decision was in accord with their social convictions and consciences, or for fear of
reversal. The Burger Court has shown no
disposition to continue this pro-equalization policy; indeed, it may well be embarked on a course of "correcting" what it
takes to be the excesses of that policy. 9
It is now those lower court judges who
had agreed with this policy who are con-

9 See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
217 (1971); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
See also Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE
L.J. 1198 (1971). To bring a case in an effort
to extend this policy in the present climate may
be worse than futile, since an adverse precedent
may legitimize an anti-equalizing program or
policy, see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), and would make it difficult for a later
court with a different attitude to hold that program or policy illegal.
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strained by fear of reversal. This is not
to suggest that the social policies of the
Burger Court will necessarily set the tone
for judicial decision-making throughout the
majority of the careers of present law students, though this is indeed possible. We
cannot predict whether the policies of
either the Warren or the Burger Court will
set the pattern for Courts which follow.
Hence, while data from the Warren era
can provide some insight into the possibilities of test case litigation given a favorable
judicial climate, there is no basis for extrapolating from such data to a prediction
that the ratio, number, or importance of
real successes achieved during this era can
be duplicated in the future.
We may, however, be aided in estimating
the probable fruitfulness of future test case
litigation by examining certain structural
factors, unlikely to change radically in the
space of a single legal career, which impede significant judicially-initiated changes
in the stratification system and its consequences, or in such other matters of concern to many liberal and radical law students as the place and influence of the
military-industrial complex in American
government and the general balance that
has been struck between the interests of
the state, the corporations, and the citizens.
These structural factors relate to the role
of the courts in the American legal system
as well as in the broader social, economic,
and political system, and to the background
and training of judges.
Innumerable books and articles, both
scholarly and popular, have been written
criticizing-and occasionally defendingjudicial, especially Supreme Court, decision-making on the basis of ethical notions

("role norms") as to the sorts of things
courts should or should not do.10 One
widely supported judicial role norm is that
judges are not free to fashion whatever
rule or result they believe would best deal
with the problem or case at bar, but must
rather announce whatever rule and reach
whatever result is dictated by the application of their technical skill in interpreting
legal materials and applying them to the
facts. This norm is typically justified by arguing that we have a democratic form of
government, that judges do not-and are
not expected to-respond directly to the
popular will, and that it would therefore be
anomalous for judges to make policy decisions, rather than merely carry out policy
decisions made by the popularly-responsive
organs of government. This norm frequently
conflicts with the norm (equally subscribed
to) that judges must decide every case properly before them. The result of this "role
strain" has been the development of a set of
canons of decision-making technique which
permit courts to decide cases such as these
without appearing to be making any policy
choice on their own. Thus, a recent survey
of prevailing opinions from three appellate
courts revealed only four decision-making
techniques in good currency: the Particularistic (court applies what it assumes to
be settled legal rules to the facts at hand)
(24%), the Authoritative (court invokes
binding statutes, precedents, etc. as requiring the particular rule which it is applying
to the facts) (54%), the Grand Style
(court projects which it tries to show is a

10 See, e.g., Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971), and the sources cited

therein.
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trend in the development of the lawwhich perhaps tracks a trend in social
conditions-to reach the particular rule
which it is applying to facts) (18 % ), and
the Social Policy canon (court asserts or
proves that a particular set of values has
been adopted by authoritative groups, other
than courts, within the society, which values, under present social conditions, could
best be served by the particular rule which
it is applying to the facts) (4% ).11 None
of these canons recognizes the right-much
less the responsibility-of the judge to decide, on the basis of his own understanding
of what is wrong with a particular social
institution and of what the best possible
alternatives are, what social policy should
be chosen or devised and applied to the
case at hand. Rather, the judge's effort is
always to remove himself from the picture
as an innovator, preferring the image of
the able administrator carrying out the
decisions reached in the real centers of
power in the society. That these canons
are not merely descriptive of present-day
opinion-writing but have normative force
as canons of craftsmanlike and decently
self-restrained decision-making is shown by
the extent to which scholarly criticism of
the Warren Court attempts to show that the
Court's decisions failed to satisfy any of

11 Daynard, The Use of Social Policy in Judicial

Decision-Making, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 919, 924
(1971). The survey was of 300 randomly selected prevailing opinions delivered from 1967
through 1969 by the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Courts of Appeals
for the District of Columbia and the Second Circuits. The Statutory and Precedential categories
of the earlier article are here combined as the
Authoritative canon, and the Social Policy Derived categories as the Social Policy canon.
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these canons, and by the moral fervor of
much of this criticism. While there is an
equitable tradition of unabashed creativity
in the formulation of remedies which has
helped to justify the obvious judicial imagination embodied in Supreme Court cases
implementing the right to a desegregated
education, the right to an equally-weighted
vote, and various criminal procedural
rights, it has not protected the Court from
the criticism that it has created these and
other rights out of thin air. Although direct
evidence of the responsiveness of judges,
including Supreme Court Justices, to scholarly and media criticism is hard to come
by, it is difficult to believe that this criticism
has not had and will not continue to have
some effect in tending to keep the judges'
and justices' behavior in line with the role
norms embodied in the criticism.
There are other reasons, apart from the
constraints of the existing canons of decision-making technique, why even judges
who favor structural social changes may
be reluctant to make decisions implementing them. One is that legal categories of
rights and the range of available judicial
remedies may not be sufficient to deal effectively with the social problem at hand,
and judges fear the loss of face which results from taking action which proves to be
ineffective. Another is the limited judicial
resources for systematically investigating
social facts, in contrast to the legislative
ability to conduct wide-ranging subcommittee hearings and staff investigations, and
the executive (including the administrative
agencies) ability to commission staff and
12
independent surveys and social analyses.

12 Courts are best adapted to resolving factual
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Still another may be the relative inability
of the higher judiciary to determine what
social innovations will be accepted (if not
necessarily desired) by those sectors of the
public and of officialdom (sometimes including the lower judiciary!) which have
the power to block de facto implementation
of the reform in question. 3 Again, judges
have little power, beyond what follows
from the perceived authority of their offices, the persuasiveness of their reasoning,
and the credibility (often low) of the
threat of effective action by the sheriff or
marshall, to obtain the acquiescence of
these politically powerful individuals and
groups; executive and legislative officials,
on the other hand, can both lobby in public
and private for the acceptance of their decisions and develop complicated deals
whereby the acquiescence of the powerholders in decisions with which they are
unhappy is bought with decisions favorable
to them on other matters.
Reasons of background and training also
make it unlikely that judges will favor
leftward-tending social change. Judges, particularly in the federal courts and the state
appellate courts, have typically gained
much of their experience in private corporate practice or as prosecutors, careers
which neither attract nor produce many
radicals. These career patterns are unlikely
to change very much until important
changes in the stratification system have
occurred. Influential representatives of

and narrowly legal disputes between litigants;
their resources for social investigation are limited
to occasional "Brandeis briefs," amicus curiae
briefs, and research by law clerks at general
libraries.
13 See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.

business and professional interests, including newspapers and bar associations, demand and usually receive "high quality"
appointments to important judicial offices,
where major ingredients in the definition
of "quality" include association with highstatus clients and respect by other highstatus attorneys. As long as more prestige
is accorded those who involve themselves
in business and the maintenance of public
order than is given those who work to protect the quality of life against incursions by
industry or who try to promote social justice, influential judgeships will continue to
be filled predominantly from the ranks of
corporate and prosecuting attorneys.
Finally, the training of lawyers, both at
law school and in practice, makes them
eye warily proposals for bold innovations.
This training equips them to get what they
want in a game in which the rules are relatively fixed, growth and development
generally being limited to the interstices.
The common law changes only by small
steps; so does most statutory law, such as
income tax and commercial law. Even the
planning which lawyers do, in the form of
wills, trusts, contracts, corporate charters,
etc., is designed to stabilize situations in
order to insure to the greatest extent possible that the client's present and anticipated desires and expectations will be
fulfilled. To the extent that significant social
changes upset settled expectations, proposals for such changes are seen as bearing
a heavy burden of justification. An attitude
like this, inculcated throughout a career, is
not easily shed with a change in roles.
Hence, when lawyers become judges they
generally prefer to patch up an existing
system, preserving settled expectations even
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at the cost of some social injustice, rather
than to start afresh at the risk of unsettling
and to some extent unpredictable consequences.
None of these factors, nor even the
combination of all of them, precludes the
possibility that significant social changes
may result from future test case litigation.
But they certainly raise serious questions
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about the belief of many liberals and
radicals that the courts are likely to
make important leftward-tending structural
changes in social, economic, and political
processes. These questions become particularly poignant in light of the many law
students whose choice of a legal career
seems to have been predicated on this
belief.

